TIME: Almanac 1995

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<text id=89TT3252> <title> Dec. 11, 1989: Interview:Egon Krenz </title> <history> TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1989 Dec. 11, 1989 Building A New World </history> <article> <source>Time Magazine</source> <hdr> INTERVIEW, Page 46 He Stopped The Shooting </hdr> <body> Egon Krenz overruled his bosses to prevent bloodshed during demonstrations in East Germany. But despite a West German proposal to develop closer ties, he sees no chance for By James O. Jackson, Frederick Ungeheuer and Egon Krenz Q. After 28 years, the Berlin Wall is open. What motivated you to make this move after all these years? A. My starting point is that freedom of movement is a basic human right. Thus there could be no better proof of our sincerity about renewing socialism than by starting with human rights. I considered it a disadvantage that we were signers of the Helsinki Final Act and the Vienna declaration yet we did not abide by certain parts of those agreements. We intend by this action to emphasize the unity between word and deed. Last but not least, let me stress that to open the border does not mean that its existence should be questioned. Q. Do you mean to say there are other classes that should now be included in the formation of political consensus? A. I am in favor of a solution of all the problems of this society by reaching consensus by all the existing social and political forces in the country. There is always more than one solution for a given problem. The most important element of consensus is that it serves the majority of the people. Nothing should happen that would serve only a part of this society and not the majority. Q. Several very senior members of the party and the government have been expelled recently from the Politburo, the Central Committee and the party. What were the most serious infractions they committed against the state and the people? A. First and foremost, their actions and their behavior led to the loss of the confidence that the people had put in them. There was a gap between words and deeds. With regard to Gunter Mittag, who was in charge of the economy, he did misuse his office and was expelled from the party for it. I hesitate to say more at this point in time because it would be wrong for me to interfere in a case that is the subject of judicial proceedings. Q. In your long career, you have been responsible for youth affairs and, as a member of the Politburo, for state security. Why did you not insist on reforms much earlier? A. There are many steps along a career path, and every honest politician goes up a learning curve. In the beginning, I felt that Erich Honecker was a person worth emulating because of the way he combined economic achievement with social progress and the great attention he paid to youth affairs. Later I felt very strongly about decisions that had very little to do with reality. I expressed this view on repeated occasions in the mid-'80s, when great changes were taking place in socialist societies, primarily in the Soviet Union. In the leadership there was a majority, influenced by Honecker, Mittag and others, that opposed these international changes. You can imagine that as a man less than 50 at that time, faced with a General Secretary over 70, my views were not always accepted. Q. He considered you a mere youngster...? A. Yes, you could say that. But furthermore, to change policies you need a political majority. My political friends will confirm that I felt very much inspired by the ideas of Gorbachev, without thinking that the same changes had to be introduced here. We were and still are different countries. The essential thing is socialism with a human face combined with democracy. I am convinced that if we had opted for this course earlier, we would not have stumbled into the political crisis in which we find ourselves now. Q. Is it true that on Oct. 9 you personally intervened to prevent another Tiananmen Square happening in Leipzig by countermanding a written order by Honecker to use military units in and around the city--which had received live ammunition--to put down the demonstrations by force, on the grounds that they were counterrevolutionary? A. These demonstrations had been going on for several weeks. The situation became more aggravated on Oct. 9. Members of my and other parties refused to acknowledge that we were confronted with a popular movement aimed at bringing about a renewal in this country. I cannot confirm the existence of any order to shoot or that a distribution of ammunition took place. But clashes between demonstrators and the People's Police were possible. I was telephoned that evening by one of my political friends, then the second secretary of the district Helmut Hackenberg, who was in charge of the action. He informed me that several local personalities, including three secretaries of the party, had joined Gewandhaus Orchestra director Kurt Masur in a public appeal against the use of violence. Although I was not empowered to do so by the office I held at the time, I told my political friends that their appeal was correct, and I encouraged them to act in such a way that everything would end without the use of force. That same week, in preparation for the next Monday, Oct. 16 (when more demonstrations were expected), I went to Leipzig, together with people who were responsible for security. We drew up instructions that 1) any kind of violent confrontation must be avoided, 2) in no case should firearms be used, and this was summed up in an order by the chairman of the National Defense Committee. I then went to the room in which we are now sitting and presented the order to Honecker. I insisted on his signing it, which he did. And there is one more thing, which I have not yet said in public. I told my political friends in Leipzig, no matter what the final order looks like, even if it should be a different order, you will refuse to use firearms. Today I'm glad we acted this way because it enabled us to protect the peaceful revolution in our country. Q. You told them in effect that if there was any order to shoot, they should ignore it? A. Yes. It was not an easy decision for me because I was not General Secretary at the time. For me it was a question of conscience and a deep personal conviction that in the civilized world, conflicts can be resolved only by political means. Q. How can relations between the two German states and their respective allies be improved? A. Today we have a unique opportunity to contribute to the construction of the "European home." This seems to me a more constructive approach than to give priority to the unity of Germany. It is obvious that the citizens of the Federal Republic have no interest in joining a socialist society, while people in this country do not want to change their socialist society into a capitalist one. Besides, the existence of two German states is a stabilizing factor for European security. To be perfectly frank, despite differences in views, I know of no serious politician, either in the East or the West, who is interested in the unification of the two states. If one speaks of confederation today, one must ask, On what basis? It would be necessary to have a common foreign policy, a common defense policy. I ask you, Do these conditions exist? We are prepared to leave the Warsaw Pact, if the Federal Republic is prepared to leave NATO. So long as both states remain in their political and military alliances, a confederation of the two states is simply not possible. Allow me to add that I think that in the future the Warsaw Pact and NATO will have greater political importance than military, and that it is in this context that a common "European home" will be built. It has been generally accepted that the creation of the G.D.R. marked a turning point in European history. Now you could reverse the whole thing and say the disappearance of the G.D.R. would also constitute another turning point. At the present time, it would serve neither the interests of peace nor stability, nor would it be in the interest of human beings. Q. Do you think that at the end of this whole process, there will be a neutral, nuclear-free zone in Central Europe as already exists to the north in Finland and Sweden and to the south in Austria and Switzerland? A. Quite simply, yes. I can imagine that the center of Europe could become a nuclear weapons-free area. The G.D.R. has declared that it would not be necessary to wait for the completion of the common "European home" to accomplish this but that it could start immediately. Q. How do you see developments in relations between the G.D.R. and the U.S.? A. President Bush sent me a very significant and friendly letter in connection with both my election as head of state and the removal of travel restrictions. I consider this a signal for closer relations with the U.S. There are some issues that still need to be clarified. Q. What issues? Would you like most-favored-nation treatment, for instance? A. Well, why not? Trade is always stabilizing. Q. As you know, Malta rhymes with Yalta. Do you think one day we will look back at Malta as another historic turning point? A. Times have changed. Today responsibility for the world is borne by all countries, great and small. There are aspects of the Yalta agreement that must remain intact. It is difficult to look into the future, but I do think Malta is a meeting of historic significance. </body> </article> </text>